Abstract. We present a model-checking algorithm which can be used to evaluate access control policies, and a tool which implements it. The evaluation includes not only assessing whether the policies give legitimate users enough permissions to reach their goals, but also checking whether the policies prevent intruders from reaching their malicious goals. Policies of the access control system and goals of agents must be described in the access control description and specification language introduced as ¦ § in our earlier work. The algorithm takes a policy description and a goal as input and performs two modes of checking. In the assessing mode, the algorithm searches for strategies consisting of reading and writing steps which allow the agents to achieve their goals no matter what states the system may be driven into during the execution of the strategies. In the intrusion detection mode, a weaker notion of strategy is used, reflecting the willingness of intruders to guess the value of attributes which they cannot read.
Introduction
The importance of access control is growing rapidly in a world where computers are ever-more interconnected. Access control policies are authorisation strategies upon which access control systems are built. The correctness and integrity of access control policies is crucial for an access control system to be effective. Several formalisations have been proposed in the past to understand and describe access control policies. For instance, the main principle of role-based access control (RBAC, [1] ) is assigning access rights to agents on the grounds of their having certain roles. In another approach known as mandatory access control (MAC, [2] ) systems enforce access control mechanisms that use clearances and sensitivity labels which can not be overridden by common users without special privileges. Programs can read information at the same or lower access levels, but can write to files at their access level and higher levels only.
The , respectively. We assume that rights are exercised by one agent at a time in this paper for the sake of simplicity. Thus the formulas Figure 1 shows the © script for the above EIS example. The script consists of a description part which contains the policies of the system and a specification part which contains a property to be verified. The syntax and semantics of the description part is discussed in [4] using another example.
Description Part
The description part starts with class definitions. In our example, the class 
¥ §
can read and write the parameterised predicate.
Specification Part
The keyword
£ !
separates the description part and the specification part. The specification part starts with the run-statement which specifies the numbers of the elements of each class. Four elements are assigned to ¡ ¤ £ ¥ § and eight elements to £ % in the example on Fig. 1 . These elements are used to build a finite instance of the system to be model-checked. Systems of other sizes are not considered. A similar approach is taken by Alloy 3.0 [6] when the keyword ¢ ¡ ¢ $ A % is used. The check-statement defines a property to be verified. The where-clause defines the acting agents. It states that the model-checker must establish whether there is a strategy or guessing strategy (depending on the mode) available for non-director employees 7 and 7 ¡ such that if they can realise they are both managers then somehow they can act together to set 7 's bonus 3 . Although the policies specify a manager cannot set another manager's bonus, it doesn't prevent 7 from resigning his/her managership and being set bonus by another manager. The result yes returned by the model checker shows there is indeed such a possibility. We will come back to this point in Sect. 5.2. Note that we use negation and disjunction to express implication in this case.
A check-statement consists of two parts, which are separated by "£ ¤ £ " . A quantifier prefix is on the left side of " £ ¥ £ " . "E" prefixes Existential variable definitions, and "A" prefixes universal variable definitions. Quantified variables defined in a same class may represent a same element during the checking. Credentials and a goal definition are on the right side of "£ ¤ £ " . Credentials and the goal are separated by "3 ". Credentials are attributes carried by elements of the classes (usually by agents) during the process of checking. Only rigid predicates -unwritable predicates -can be used as credentials. A credential can be either positive or negative, which means the credential is owned by the elements or is not owned by the elements. Different credentials can be connected by conjunction only to form a list of credentials and used in the checking. Credentials are used as pre-conditions for the checking.
The goal expression defines the goal that the group of agents intends to achieve. We treat all the variables defined on £ % on the left side of " £ ¤ £ " which also appear on the right side as the group of acting agents unless it is defined explicitly in the where-statement following it. If no agent-variables appear on the right side and no where-statement defines acting agents explicitly, we treat all agents in the £ % set as the group of acting agents. In other words, agents defined in a where-statement takes priority.
The goal is a combination consisting of conjunction and disjunction of three kinds of atomic goals. These are making goals, realising goals and reading goals, written using "E The Problem. Given an access control system and a goal, we need to determine whether a group of agents can achieve it. The goal is a combination of the atomic goals of finding out the values of some formulas about the state of the system ("reading") and driving the system into a state with a certain property ("making"). Conditions on what has to be achieved can be formulated using the auxiliary primitive goals of "realising" that something holds about the state, as mentioned in the previous section. To achieve the goal, agents can sample and overwrite variables that they are permitted to. Overwriting can be put down as simple assignment statements in the sought strategy, and sampling means that the sampled variable can be used to control conditional statements. Thus the strategy in question can be written in a simple language with assignment, sequential composition and
. A strategy can guarantee the achievability of the goal because it contains both the outcomes of a "if" statement. A guessing strategy is like a strategy except that it allows the agents to sample a variable even if the policies do not permit them to read the variable. A guessing strategy reflects the possibilities that the agents may be able to acquire the information they need from other sources although the system prohibits them to learn. The verification problem to determine is whether such a strategy or guessing strategy exists. As we have argued in the introduction, this question is meaningful both for intrusion detection and system functionality assessment.
The Solution. Following [3] , our algorithm is built around the knowledge of the state of the system that the considered group has at each step of implementing its strategy. Obviously there is a set of knowledge states each of which is sufficient for the group to regard its goal as achieved. This is so when the group knows that the formulas in some appropriate combination of the involved making goals are true, enough is known to work out the truth values of the formulas in the reading goals, etc. Each step takes the group from a knowledge state to a possibly richer one. A knowledge state combines knowledge of the initial state of the system and knowledge of its current state. Assignments contribute the knowledge of the current value of the assigned variable, which has been just given to it. This means that learning and changing the system are done simultaneously. To perform an assignment, a writing permission on the variable being assigned is needed. Sampling steps can be done with a reading permission and contribute both the current and the initial value of the sampled variable, unless it has already been overwritten. In the latter case sampling is redundant, because the current value must have become known upon writing it. Overwriting without sampling in advance destroys the prospect to learn the initial value of the variable. Strategies are supposed to take the group from the empty knowledge state 4 to one in which it can deem its goal achieved. 
. we show the effects that the above three kinds of transitions have on knowledge states in Fig. 2 . Therefore, by modelling the accumulation of agents' knowledge, we build a transition system over the access control system in question. Three kinds of transitional relations can be identified -overwriting-to-true, overwriting-to-false and sampling, each of which will carry the knowledge states of agents from one to another until the agents have confidence to deduce the goal is reached from their knowledge states. Once the agents reach the knowledge states from which they can deduce their goal is reached, we regard their goal has been reached. This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Note the transition relations for overwriting are deterministic; the relation for sampling is not. A strategy should lead the agents to the goal through both possible outcomes of a sampling.
To find out if there is such a strategy our solution is to invert the whole process described above and work backwards. We start from the set of knowledge states where . we continue until no new pairs are generated. Now, all the pairs whose set of knowledge states contains the initial knowledge state contain the strategies we are looking for.
To find out guessing strategies instead of strategies, the only thing needs to be changed is to omit the condition 
The Algorithm.
The algorithm for extracting strategies is described below in the form of pseudo-code. , the algorithm will output none.
Computational Complexity
We use for the set of all the knowledge states, £ £ for the total number of knowledge states, £ § £ for the number of variables in § , £ £ for the number of acting agents. The computation time of the algorithm depends on the number of subsets of it finds. In the worst case the number of the subsets of is £ £ because we prevent any subset whose elements are already found from being added to § % % " §
. Thus the worst case is that subsets of are just singletons. Because the time spent on computing pre-sets does not depend on £ £ , the worst-case complexity is
Implementation

Performance
We have implemented the above algorithm in Java. Computations are done in BDDs 5 . The tool can be downloaded from [8] . Its performance is good, despite the state explosion problem. In the EIS example, we assign 4 elements to the . During the computation we also need the primed version of variables, for all the variables in § and all knowledge variables. Therefore, the total number of variables we need in BDDs for knowledge states and transition relations together in the EIS example is
. On a computer (Pentium M 1.6G, 512M memory, running Linux, kernel version 2.6.10), it finishes one round of computation, finding one strategy, in about 18 seconds and consumes less than 160MB memory. Whereas the processing power of today's PCs grows very fast, we think our tool is highly usable. For a strategy found by the tool, see Fig. 4 
Abstraction
We have used abstraction to enable the handling of large cases by our tool. One of the bottlenecks in our approach is the computations like Therefore we have introduced three abstraction levels in the tool for users to specify when running it. The minimum level, which is level 0, is the level that no abstraction is used, that is, the tool maintains the agents' knowledge on all variables in all computations. It is the most precise level. The maximum level, level 2, is the level when an action is performed on A , the tool not only maintains the agents' knowledge on A , but also on all the other variables that occur in the goal. In the middle, level 1 is built on level 2. In this level, the tool not only maintains the agents' knowledge on A a nd all the variables in the goal, as level 2 does, but also maintains the agents' knowledge on any other variables in § specified by the user in a configuration file named abstraction.config. When working on large systems, this level can be used as counter-example driven refinement abstraction. In this level, when a false strategy is found, one can analyse that which variable has caused this strategy to be found. Thus one can put that variable in abstraction.config and run the model checker again. Having kept tracking on this variable, a number of false strategies will be ruled out. The result will be more and more precise.
With these abstraction levels, the tool performs much better. However, the more abstraction we use, from level 0 to level 2, the more precision we lose. If in level 1 or 2, the checking result is & , then it really means there is no strategy for the agents to reach their goal. But if it is , it does not guarantee there is a strategy. In fact, the answer is uncertain. By not maintaining the agents' knowledge on all variables, some transitions which actually can not happen may not be ruled out.
Related Work
Access control policies analysis has attracted much attention in recent years. Fisler and her colleagues [9] focus on verification and change-impact analysis of role-based access control policies written in XACML. They have a tool called Margrave, which reads XACML, translating them into multi-terminal decision diagrams (MTBDDs) [10] to answer queries. MTBDDs are a more general form of BDDs. Unlike a BDD which only has two terminals, 0 and 1, a MTBDD can have a set of terminals. Because XACML policy evaluation may lead to the result of permit, deny and not-applicable, MTBDDs are more suitable for translating XACML policies than BDDs. Margrave verifies whether a policy preserves a property by taking a query which expresses the property as input and outputs the answer to the query. It does do by traversing the MTBDD for the policy, using the information provided in the query and seeing which terminal it gets to. Change-impact analysis is also an important aspect of their work. Margrave can take two policies that span a set of changes as input and output a summary of the differences. Two big advantages of the approach from [9] are performance and scalability. According to their experimental data, most verification tasks take no longer than 10 milliseconds (ms), however representing policies take from 70ms to 335ms. Memory consumption is about 4.7Mbytes. Because MTBDDs scale up quite well, the tool might be capable to handle large cases.
However their approach can not detect hidden channels caused by multi-step actions and co-operations.
Consider the policies in Fig. 1 and the strategy found by the tool in Fig. 4 . The policy specifies that no manager can set another manager's bonus. However, being two managers,
